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HONEST TO BLOG: BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF
PUBLIC FIGURES AND ANONYMOUS BLOGGERS
IN DEFAMATION LAWSUITS
"I'm a modern man, a man for the millennium. Digital and
smoke free. A diversified multi-cultural, post-modern deconstruc-
tion that is anatomically and ecologically incorrect. I've been
linked and downloaded, I've been inputted and outsourced, I
know the upside of downsizing, I know the downside of upgrad-
ing. I'm a high-tech low-life. A cutting edge, state of the art, bi-
coastal multi-tasker and I can give you a gigabyte in
nanosecond. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Legal Tradition, even among its common law
peers, elevates freedom of speech far beyond what would be accept-
able in other parts of the western world. 2 This careful right, en-
shrined in the First Amendment of the United States' Constitution,
provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press ... ''3 Such protection is commonly
justified by the need to protect content-based core political speech
1. The Tonight Show with Jay Leno: The Modem Man (NBC television broadcast
Nov. 15, 2005) (presenting George Carlin performing comedic monologue carica-
turizing, albeit accurately, popular conception of modern man circa 2005, reflec-
tive of average blogger). "I interface with my database, my database is in
cyberspace, so I'm interactive, I'm hyperactive and from time to time I'm radioac-
tive." Id.
2. See generally Guy E. Carmi, Dignity versus Liberty: The Two Western Cultures of
Free Speech, 26 B.U. INTr'L L.J. 277, 322-24 (2008) (noting that German "Dignity-
based" Free Expression jurisprudence provides more constraining framework than
American "Liberty-based" Free Expression jurisprudence for free speech). "Many
commentators have noted that '[t] he United States stands alone, even among de-
mocracies, in the extraordinary degree to which its constitution protects freedom
of speech and of the press."' Id. at 339; see also Roger P. Alford, Free Speech and the
Case for Constitutional Exceptionalism, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1071, 1075-79 (2008) (not-
ing scholastic comparative differences between American model of free speech
from that of Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom). In particular,
the following observations were noted:
There may be a universal consensus that speech should be protected, but
there is no universal agreement about the concrete application of that
guarantee .... [R]eview of the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan,
and the United Kingdom reveals vast differences. . . regarding the scope
of the speech right, its theoretical basis, its priority vis-a-vis other, compet-
ing rights, and the institution that best serves as its guardian.
Id. at 1082.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
(229)
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so inherently fragile, yet vital to the functioning of the democratic
process of the United States. 4 Fragile free speech, which is viewed
as being easily suppressed by a strong government, is protected by
numerous doctrines developed by the Supreme Court, which were
designed to defend free speech since the First Amendment's ratifi-
cation on December 15, 1791. 5 Modern free speech, however, suf-
fers no such frailty thanks to the Internet. 6
Post-Internet 2.0 free speech is most commonly represented by
the blog, websites devoted almost solely to giving voice to a person's
thoughts and beliefs using the Internet as the medium of free ex-
change.7 Blog authors ("bloggers") are as diverse as the subject
matters they cover, which can include the news, music, politics,
sports and travel.8 Over the past ten years, the number of blogs has
grown from a "handful" to over one hundred and eighty-four mil-
lion worldwide. 9 Additionally, as blogs began to respond to one
4. See id.
5. See Carmi, supra note 2, at 342-45 (reviewing basis and evolution of Ameri-
can exceptionalism in area of Free Speech, including jurisprudential mechanisms
developed from Warren Court to Burger Court, establishing different standards
compared to rest of world in public figure defamation, fairness doctrine in public
broadcasting, and hate speech). "Many Americans are probably unaware of the
great disparities between the United States' and the Western world's treatment of
speech." Id. at 344.
6. See Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defa-
mation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1447, 1448-51 (2006)
(recognizing Internet as mature technology with potential to serve numerous func-
tions, including journalistic, to world-wide de-centralized audiences). "Because
the Internet is no longer in its infancy.., traditional defamation laws should apply
to Internet bloggers." Id. at 1451. But see Electronic Frontier Foundation, Bloggers'FAQ
- Online Defamation Law, http://www.eff.org/issues/bloggers/legal/liability/defa-
mation, (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (discussing rights available to Bloggers accused
of Defamation and recent court decisions that have effect there on, and asserting
that blogs and online free speech are fragile and require continued heightened
protection afforded by Constitution in defamation).
7. See Technorati: State of the Blogosphere 2008, http://technorati.com/
blogging/state-of-the-blogosphere/, (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (identifying 'blogs'
and 'blogging' as global mainstream phenomenon, and tracking growth of blogs
as statistical measure of Internet use).
8. See id. (follow "Day 2: The What And Why of Blogging" hyperlink) (survey-
ing bloggers for subject of their blogging and blogs, resulting in data suggesting
that, on average, top subjects for blogging are: personal/lifestyle (54%), technol-
ogy (46%), other (43%), news (42%), politics (35%), and music (31%)).
9. See Rebecca Blood, Weblogs: A History and Perspective, http://www.rebecca
blood.net/essays/weblog-history.html, (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (noting origin
of weblog community in 1998, tracing recent historical development into larger
community, and evolution of blog form).
[W]eblogs had always included a mix of links, commentary, and personal
notes, in the post-Blogger explosion increasing numbers of weblogs es-
chewed this focus on the web-at-large in favor of a sort of short-form jour-
nal. These blogs, often updated several times a day, were instead a record
[Vol. 17: p. 229
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another and join together in various communities, the interaction
between blogs has increased exponentially into a widely dispersed
community. 10 Perhaps equally significant has been the general re-
ception of blogging as an accepted medium, demonstrated by the
adoption of blogging on various corporate websites, including
those of large media companies."
As blogs continue to proliferate, diversify and become increas-
ingly complex, the potential for tort suits, such as defamatory libel,
increases.1 2 The laws of tort and constitutionally based free speech
were developed in the absence of the Internet, mostly to address
the concerns of the more traditional news media outlets.13 As an
ever-increasing number of citizen journalists continue to supplant
blogs and other Internet-based social networks, courts are being
challenged to apply legal standards developed for traditional media
jurisprudence to blogs and bloggers. 14 Recently, courts have had to
of the blogger's thoughts: Something noticed on the way to work, notes
about the weekend, a quick reflection on some subject or another.
Id.; see also Technorati, supra note 7 (referencing Universal McCann Study of
March 2008 counting 184 million blogs globally, 26.4 million of which are in the
United States).
10. See id. (surveying blog growth trends, noting corn Score Media Metrix, as
of August 2008, recognized 77.7 million visitors to blogs within the US and of so-
cial networking sites, including Facebook.com which recognized 41.0 million total
visitors and MySpace.com which recognized 75.1 million total visitors).
11. See id. (citing Bivings Group report stating 95% of top 100 US newspapers
have reporter blogs, and noting trends of increased blog site visitor traffic, and
posts on significant event days, such as posts tagged "Obama" during Democratic
National Convention following August 28, 2008, and posts tagged "McCain" follow-
ing John McCain's selection of Alaskan Governor, Sarah Palin, following August
29, 2008).
12. See S. Elizabeth Malloy, Anonymous Blogging and Defamation: Balancing Inter-
ests on the Internet, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1187, 1187-88 (2006) (attributing rarity of
large libel suits against anonymous bloggers to lack of deep pockets, blogger soci-
ety norms discouraging libel suits, difficulty of proving "actual malice" and relative
ease of correction for mistakes on online medium). But see Technorati, supra note
7 (noting increased corporate and business presence within blogging community,
increased monetary investments within blogs, and growth of brands within
blogosphere).
13. See Daniel J. Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the
Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1195, 1198-99 (2006) (asserting that direct applica-
tion of law to Internet might yield unintended consequences, such as affording
greater or lesser speech protection than was intended by drafters); see also Malloy,
supra note 12, at 1188-89 (recognizing recent cases in Delaware and other states
challenging Court to determine proper standard for application to anonymous
blogging).
14. See id.; see also Solove, supra note 13, at 1195-97 (contrasting various types
of bloggers by using example of two blogs with superficially similar characteristics,
such as subject matter, fame, and visitor numbers, to illustrate differences and vari-
ety within blogosphere which provides different standards for regulation between
blogs and traditional media). "We have a rather romantic vision of bloggers ...
[b]ut the average blogger isn't Eugene [Volokh], writer of the Volokh Conspiracy
2010]
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determine the proper legal standard for public figure defamation
and First Amendment protection for the blogosphere.' 5
This Comment, through a hypothetical lawsuit in which a pub-
lic figure plaintiff alleges libel by an Internet blog, explores the is-
sue of tort defamation by anonymous bloggers in connection with
the legal challenge of balancing constitutional First Amendment
protections, and the complicated regime of legal requirements de-
veloped pursuant to those standards. 16 Section II provides back-
ground information on public-figure defamation and constitutional
anonymity free speech protections.1 7
Section III is divided into three parts. Part A explores the inter-
section of First Amendment rights to anonymity in protection and
defamation standards for public figures, and examines the
problems that arise in discovery, service of process and other as-
pects of civil procedure, by applying the established legal standards
for defamation to the hypothetical fact pattern.18 Part B assumes a
plaintiffs ability to overcome defendant anonymity, and examines
the challenges of proving the elements of defamation required
against public figures when the standard is applied to the new In-
ternet media blog-form. 19 Finally, Part C investigates suggested so-
lutions for the problem of establishing a successful libel case against
an anonymous Internet-based defendant by a public figure plaintiff,
including alternative legal claims, non-legal solutions and the weak-
ening of defamation/anonymity protections.20
Blog, [t]he... most common blogger is a teenage girl. Many blogs are more akin
to diaries than news articles, op-ed columns, or scholarship." Id. at 1196-97.
15. See Solove, supra note 13, at 1199 (asserting "existing law lacks nimble ways
to resolve disputes about speech and privacy on the Internet," resulting from blog-
gers generally being unable to afford costly lawsuits).
16. For a further discussion of the hypothetical presented to explore anony-
mous blogging and public figure defamation, see infra notes 120 to 126.
17. For a further discussion of the historical evolution of American anonymity
in publishing and defamation jurisprudence, see infra notes 60 to 119.
18. For a further discussion of the problems arising from application of First
Amendment anonymity protection and public figure defamation standards, see in-
fra notes 127 to 163.
19. For a further discussion of the legal analysis of proving a public figure
defamation case against an anonymous blog, see infra notes 164 to 184.
20. For a further discussion of possible solutions to the impasses provided by
applying the strict standard of anonymity and the requirement of actual malice in
public figure defamation, see infra notes 185 to 216.
[Vol. 17: p. 229
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Blogosphere: The Proliferation of the Fourth Estate 21
At its most basic level, a blog is a website "usually maintained by
an individual with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of
events, or other material such as graphics or video."22 Blogging has
proven to be tremendously popular because of its flexibility in ad-
dressing a variety of subject matter, the ease of starting them
through host websites and the potential mass audience for any
given topic. 23 Given the mass appeal of blogging, it is unsurprising
that the bloggers themselves are demographically diverse spanning
a wide breadth of geography, age, educational level, income and
race.24 More recently, blogs have developed professional roles
commonly used to increase a professional's industry exposure, en-
hance resumes to potential employers and increase executive
visibility.
2 5
The challenge of determining what rights and standards apply
to blogs and bloggers first requires an analysis of the legal status of
21. See Merriam- Webster Dictionary: 'Fourth Estate, 'MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fourth_estate (last visited Oct. 31,
2009) (defining fourth estate to mean free press).
22. Technorati, supra note 7 (characterizing "blog" for purposes of identify-
ing applicable websites in study, survey, and trend spotting).
A Blog (a contraction of term "Web log") is a Web site, usually main-
tained by an individual with regular entries of commentary, descriptions
of events, or other material such as graphics or video. Entries are com-
monly displayed in reverse-chronological order. The Blogosphere is a
collective community of all blogs. Since all blogs are on Internet by defi-
nitions, they may be seen as interconnected and socially networked. Dis-
cussions 'in the Blogosphere' have been used by the media as a gauge of
public opinion on various issues.
Id.
23. See id. (follow "Day 2: The What And Why of Blogging" hyperlink) (report-
ing that 133 million blog records have been indexed by Technorati since 2002,
and commenting that blogging topics have diverse range including personal/lifes-
tyle, technology, news, politics, computers, music, film, travel, business, and travel
update; and have diverse style, including sincere, conversational, humorous, moti-
vational, snarky, and confrontational).
24. See id. (providing demographic breakdown of bloggers by geographic ori-
gin (U.S., European, and Asian), blog-type (Personal, Corporate, Professional,
with and without Advertising), and gender (with statistical breakdowns of age, mar-
ital status, household income, education level, and average monthly unique visi-
tors); and among Bloggers within United States, 57% are male, 42% are between
18 and 34, 56% are employed fulltime, and 74% are college graduates).
25. See id. (surveying professional uses for blogs as having positive impact re-
sulting from benefits including increased industry exposure, posting resumes for
potential employers, increasing executive visibility, promotional opportunities,
change of profession or industry interests, or, in few cases, as alternative career
path).
2010]
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blogs.26 This determination of the blogs' legal status depends in
part on whether blogs are entitled to First Amendment authorship
anonymity protection. 27 Moreover, the legal status of blogs (as ei-
ther media source or non-media source) is important to the deter-
mination of whether, in defamation, blogs are held to the standard
of established publications such as The New York Times, or to lesser
standards of defamation. 28
1. What are Blogs? (A Legal Question)
Because blogs are a relatively recent innovation, courts have
had difficulty in classifying them as either private writings or free
press. 29 The classification of blogs is important in determining
what standard applies to them in cases of defamation and free
speech. 30 Further, because blogs may behave like a news source in
function, there is a genuine debate regarding whether other jour-
26. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DuKE L.J. 855, 904-07 (2000), (discussing modern First Amendment
doctrine with respect to free speech as device crafted "largely for the benefit of the
institutional media, and these privileges are not entirely responsive to the chilling
effect of defamation law on nonmedia defendants of the type targeted by the new
Internet libel actions. Indeed it is not even certain what level of First Amendment
protections, if any, the typical John Doe defendant would receive."); see also id. at
905-06 (exploring lack of distinction between Media/Nonmedia categorization
that John Doe would receive, as "Internet users like John Doe defy the traditional
distinction between media and nonmedia defendants.... [T]he Supreme Court
traditionally has referred to only the institutional media-broadcasters, newspaper
publishers, and so forth-as the "media" for First Amendment purposes. The ques-
tion, then is whether nonmedia defendants like John Doe are entitle to the same
level of First Amendment protection as media defendants.").
27. See Anne M. Macrander, Bloggers as Newsmen: Expanding the Testimonial Priv-
ilege, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1075, 1095-96 (summarizing various courts' approaches to
applying journalism shield laws to new media, generally refusing to categorize
blogs and bloggers with respect to defamation law, often choosing to resolve ques-
tion on different points of law). "While courts have been hesitant to affirmatively
rule how bloggers fit into existing definitions of journalism, California in particu-
lar has been more willing to decide what criteria will not be used in shaping those
definitions." Id. at 1097.
28. See id. at 1095-98 (asserting legal determination between bloggers and
journalists as important question requiring binding judicial or legislative gui-
dance, despite academic attempts to define); see also Lidsky, supra note 26, at 915-
20 (spotting inadequacies of applying actual malice standard to John Doe defend-
ants in corporate plaintiff suits for Internet libel, and highlighting duties of report-
ers and media to publish and report accurate information, which is paradigm that
breaks down when applying situation to InternetJohn Doe's).
29. SeeJennifer L. Peterson, The Shifting Legal Landscape of Blogging, Wisconsin
Lawyer, 79-MAR Wis. LAw. 8, 44 (stressing that blogs may not fit within current
statutory and legal framework, including Supreme Court framework for public/
private actors, Federal Election Commission guidelines, and Federal laws, includ-
ing Communications Decency Act of 1996).
30. See Malloy, supra note 12, at 1188-90 (noting courts' reluctance to classify
blogs in absence of any guiding principles, precedent for Internet, and statutory
[Vol. 17: p. 229
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nalistic protections, including shield laws and source-checking re-
quirements, apply to bloggers. 31 In practice, most courts have
found relatively easy ways to sidestep the issue of classification. 32
In the past, when addressing new technologies of the time pe-
riod, such as radio and television, courts have taken an approach
that ignores the medium in favor of the content. 33 This approach,
however, is not without problems as courts have traditionally had
difficulty adapting "telegraph, radio, and television into the tradi-
tional . . . framework [of defamation law] because the technical
workings initially confounded the legal community."34 In such
cases, "the laws changed to focus on the impact of the transmitted
speech and not the utilized medium when evaluating. . . claims." 35
Such an approach disregards the medium entirely and focuses on
the content, which provides a standardized approach for analysis of
guidelines, resulting in overly sympathetic standards to anonymous bloggers in def-
amation lawsuits from victim's perspectives).
31. See id. at 1187 (underscoring disagreement among legal commentators
regarding proper relationship between libel law and blogosphere); see also Mac-
rander, supra note 27, at 1098 (2008) (accentuating debate among blogger and
journalism communities in absence of court distinction between two groups, and
noting attempts to distinguish by "obligation to tell the truth" or "fact checking"
standards unjustifiable as both communities' have failed to apply given standard).
Referencing events like "Memogate" which resulted in resignation of CBS news
anchor, Dan Rather, as failure to both blog and journalistic community. Id. But
see Comment, Protecting the New Media: Application of the Journalist's Privilege to Blog-
gers, 120 HARv. L. REv. 996, 1004-07 (2007) (suggesting extension of traditional
news media protections, including State Shield Laws, to blogging community is
dependent on their function and importance to free flow of information and pub-
lic interest, as opposed to strict definition, despite lack of formal editorial and
attendant process); see also Patrick M. Garry, Anonymous Sources, Libel Law, and the
First Amendment, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 579, 585-89 (2005) (reviewing history of Fourth
Estate protections evolved by Supreme Court and including theoretical bases for
importance of Free Press).
32. See Macrander, supra note 27, at 1085-87 (noting recent focus by courts
and legislatures on applying testimonial journalistic privileges to bloggers has been
experimental and varied in standards, ranging from strict definitional standards to
lenient and open application); see also Lidsky, supra note 26 (revealing several cases
in which courts declined to address issue of blogging directly, instead resolving
cases on less controversial issue).
33. See Troiano, supra note 6, at 1463-66 (commenting on previous difficulty
experienced by historical courts attempting to integrate telegraph, radio, and tele-
vision into traditional defamation framework, resulting in disparate defamation
standards for similar defamatory content based in different media). Later courts
would adapt by shifting focus of analysis to impact of defamatory content as op-
posed to medium of transmission. See id.
34. Id. at 1465 (discussing broad immunity established for Internet commu-
nity in previous court decisions to focus on message instead of medium, establish-
ing presumption of media-based non-defamation).
35. Id. (preferring message-focused defamation analysis as appropriate in
cases to provide standardization instead of media-focused treatment of defamatory
content).
2010]
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defamatory content across different media. In contrast, this stan-
dard is difficult to implement in the Internet era, when the me-
dium used allows defamatory content to proliferate by the
hundreds of thousands as opposed to a more limited medium
(such as television, in which broadcasts are generally limited in
number and generally known) .36
Avoiding the issue of blog classification as news media or non-
news media, while legally expedient, is unlikely to continue given
the tremendous growth of blogs.3 7 As additional cases in various
jurisdictions develop increasingly disparate standards in the catego-
rization of blogs, as either more or less similar to existing news me-
dia standards, it will become increasingly necessary for courts to
develop a flexible (possibly consistent) legal framework to under-
stand and determine the appropriate standard under the circum-
stances of each case, as opposed to a wholesale categorization of
blogs through a single legal standard.38
2. Why are Blogs Important?
Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines 'mass media' as "a me-
dium of communications (as newspapers, radio, or television) that
is designed to reach the mass of the people."39 In subsequent years,
Merriam-Webster may extend its definition to follow public usage
of the word to include the Internet and blogging.40 Blogging has
36. See id. at 1467-74 (summarizing difficulties applying traditional defama-
tion approach to blogs, including scope limitations, confusion regarding holding
blogs to journalistic standards and dangers of Internet blogging).
[I] t is likely that many bloggers will knowingly allow harmful, defamatory
statements on their blogs in order to attract wide audiences .... [T]he
trend in allowing broad immunity to Internet users and providers under
the [Communications Decency Act of 1986] allows them to take advan-
tage of all the burdens conferred by Congress in the Communications
Decency Act, and then some, without accepting any of the burdens that
Congress intended ....
Id. at 1466-71 (internal quotations omitted).
37. See Lidsky, supra note 26, at 920-25 (mentioning recent court decision
have added pressure to develop uniform standard for dealing with blogs in defa-
mation cases); see also Technorati, supra note 7 (identifying trends increasing num-
ber of blogs within United States and their increased sophistication and
incorporation within political and social commentary).
38. See Lidsky, supra note 26, at 944-45 (describing Supreme Court's piece-
meal application of First Amendment, including anomalies created by defamation
law and highlighting additional problems created by new Internet libel for First
Amendment doctrine which require Supreme Court resolution).
39. Merriam-Webster Dictionary: 'Mass Media,' MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mass-media (last visited Oct. 31,
2009).
40. See Technorati, supra note 7 (recognizing increasing number of blogs and
bloggers using sophisticated advertising tools and platforms to generate reader loy-
[Vol. 17: p. 229
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not only increased in popularity amongst the general populace, but
has also met greater acceptance among highly educated and afflu-
ent individuals. 41 Additionally, blogging is an act that is demo-
graphically diverse and is an increasingly global phenomenon
continually gaining acceptance and authority.42
Blogging is becoming a readily accepted and pervasive part of
the Internet experience, such that many people and corporations
view blogging as an opportunity to expand their Internet pres-
ence. 43 Far from being an eccentric Internet sub-culture, the
blogosphere is being adapted by mainstream culture. 44 Further,
blogs have been adopted in academia by professors and deans, in
media by reporters as part of mainstream media websites, and in
other corporate and professional areas. 45
B. The First Amendment
For centuries, American courts have struggled to define the
limits of free speech in accordance with both the established laws
and the political practicality.46 Such complexity has resulted in a
alty, and general increase in investment, profitability, and time invested into
blogging).
41. See id. (noting blogging popularity as pastime among those with higher
education and significant income to invest in act of blogging).
42. See id. (showing varied distribution of bloggers by geographic distribution,
including 48% in North America, 27% in Europe, 13% in Asia, and 7% in South
America).
43. See id. (Follow "Day 1: Who Are the Bloggers?" Hyperlink). (recognizing
characterization of blogs, that of total bloggers surveyed: 79% are personal, 12%
are corporate and 46% are professional bloggers, with significant overlap between
all three groups).
44. See id. (finding brand and corporate presence within blogosphere in-
creased, owing primarily to vast potential for advertising and brand shaping oppor-
tunity among blogosphere audience, measuring as of August 2008 to be
approximately 77.7 million unique visitors within United States); see also Older,
Wealthier Men Fuel Triple-Digit Growth of Political Blogs, http://www.marketingcharts.
com/topics/blogs/older-wealthier-men-fuel-triple-digit-growth-of-political-blogs-
6504/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (tracking explosive growth trends among older,
wealthier males during political seasons among political blogs, such as Huffington
Post.com and Politico.com, which, in September 2008, logged 4.5 million and 2.4
million visitors respectively).
45. See Technorati, supra note 7. (perceiving growth of blogging in profes-
sional, corporate and academic areas, in supplement to majority of blogs which
remain personal). Companies generally share the belief that it is important to
reach out to bloggers to be brand advocates, and that generally, bloggers tend to
be early adopters of new web applications. See id.
46. See David A.J. Richards, A Theory of Free Speech, 34 UCLA L.R. 1837, 1891-95
(1987) (setting forth various philosophical bases for free speech applied by Ameri-
can courts, including utilitarian, democratic protection, and critical theory, all of
which vastly differ from founding fathers' original conception of free speech).
"Americans very actively debate ... how we should understand the intent of the
2010]
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distinction among the type of protections offered to free speech,
based on whether it was content or non-content based.47 Addition-
ally, besides the continual struggle to define the limits of freedom
of speech, the impact of technology and socio-economic organiza-
tion place pressure on courts and legislatures to redefine ancient
rights in modern contexts. 48
The emergence of the Internet has had a tremendous impact
on the right to free speech and the legal right to publish anony-
mously.49 The Internet allows for an individual, named or anony-
mous, to publish material to the public at a significantly lower cost
and to a larger potential audience than through traditional publish-
ing.50 The ability to self-publish on the Internet has magnified the
effectiveness of anonymous authors' ability to spread their work
through the populace, and to develop a social presence. 51
Due to the prevalence of the Internet in modern American so-
ciety, the legislatures and courts have attempted to adapt the legal
system to free speech on the Internet in a variety of ways. 52 Con-
Founders who wrote and ratified the 1787 Constitution [and] the 1791 Bill of
Rights... It is [commonly believed] that the Founders aspired to this kind of long-
term durability ... It is, of course, nothing of the kind." Id. at 1839-40.
47. See Macrander, supra note 27, at 1086-89 (identifying different standards
between protection for reporters and individual shield statutes among states, rang-
ing from strict and specific to lenient and open, resulting in controversial and
inconsistent application to blogs outside meaning of publication and news).
48. See id. at 1093-97 ("[Defamation] common law clashes almost fundamen-
tally with Internet users' asserted 'First Amendment right to speak anonymously on
Internet."').
49. See Lidsky, supra note 26, at 857-61 (illustrating impact of free speech on
Internet and anonymous publishing through hypothetical anonymous day trader
who posts online accusations alleging fraud by company against its investors and
difficulty of resulting lawsuit); see also Macrander, supra note 27, at 1093 (stating
"[t]he current state of privacy law, even in the face of the asserted First Amend-
ment right to speak anonymously, does not bode well for the bloggers and
[i]nternet users who wish to publish under the cloak of [i]nternet anonymity...
even given the judicial tools of a balancing test to determine parties' interests and
a validly issued subpoena, the basic function and system of the Internet medium
ensures that some users, however criminal, defamatory, or patriotic, nevertheless
remain anonymous.").
50. See Lidsky, supra note 26, at 860-61 (stating "[t]he [i]nternet is... a pow-
erful tool for equalizing imbalances of power by giving voice to the disen-
franchised and by allowing more democratic participation in public discourse. In
other words, the [i]nternet allows ordinary John Does to participate as never
before in public discourse, and hence, to shape public policy.").
51. See id. at 862 (explaining "[i]n the real world, the author is separated
from her audience by both space and time .... Internet communication lacks this
formal distance.").
52. See Richards, supra note 46, at 1851-58 (identifying adaptations of original
theory of Constitutional interpretation from Founders as differing from modern
conceptions of free speech theory).
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gress has passed a number of laws attempting to adapt and enforce
a legal regime to the Internet, including the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act of 1986 (hereinafter "ECPA"), the Communica-
tions Decency Act of 1996 (hereinafter "CDA"), and the PATRIOT
Act.53 As a result, Congress has both expanded and limited the
rights of certain groups on the Internet.54 The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act has expanded the right to Internet speech and informa-
tion.55 In contrast, the ECPA, the CDA, and the PATRIOT Act have
attempted limited Internet speech in favor of other government
considerations.56
1. Anonymous Writing: An American Tradition
The tradition of anonymity in American writing dates back to
the founding fathers. 57 Thomas Paine published his famous pam-
phlet Common Sense anonymously, arguing for revolution against En-
gland.58 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay
53. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2009). See 47 U.S.C.A
§ 230 (West 2009) (section of Communications Decency Act not invalidated by
Supreme Court in Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)). See Patriot
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 115 Stat 272 (2001).
54. See Troiano, supra note 6, at 1450 (recognizing Congressional motivation
for signing CDA, which immunizes Internet service providers from third-party de-
famatory postings by its users, was to foster development of Internet). But see
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1547-48 (2007) (discussing Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002's main purpose as closing loopholes left by Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act).
55. See Freedom of Information Act, § 552 (directing government agencies, sub-
ject to certain time frame and extraneous considerations, to make records availa-
ble to public upon request).
56. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (West
2009). See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (section of Communications Decency Act not invali-
dated by Supreme Court in Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 115 Stat 272.
57. See Victoria Smith Ekstrand, UnmaskingJane and John Doe: Online Anonymity
and the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 405, 406-07 (2003) (reviewing history
of anonymous speech in United States, referencing founding fathers' reliance on
anonymity in newspapers and pamphlets to develop grassroots support for Ameri-
can Revolution, with colorful pseudonyms including 'Publius,' 'An American Citi-
zen,' 'Marcus,' and 'Amerinicus.'); see also Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 54, at 1541-
42 (presenting Supreme Court's justifications in recent cases (citing McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)) for anonymous speech rested first, in
contributions of anonymous publishing to mankind, citing Federalist Papers and
works of Mark Twain and George Elliot in example, and second, to protect autho-
rial autonomy for controversial or unpopular thoughts).
58. See R.B. Bernstein, Rediscovering Thomas Paine, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 873,
874-75 (1994) (highlighting importance of anonymity for Thomas Paine's writings
and their effective contributions to revolutionary war); see also Ekstrand, supra note
57, at 406 (documenting tradition of historical anonymous publishing in United
States from Founding Fathers to Civil War reporters).
2010]
11
Tham: Honest to Blog: Balancing the Interests of Public Figures and Ano
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
240 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JouRNAL
assumed pseudonyms when authoring the Federalist Papers.59
Given the historical significance, it is unsurprising that freedom of
speech and the right to publish anonymously holds a uniquely re-
vered place within American jurisprudence. 60
The Supreme Court has upheld the right to publish anony-
mously as supported by the First Amendment in TaLey v. Califor-
nia.61 In Talley, the Court addressed the question of whether a Los
Angeles city ordinance, restricting distribution of pamphlets failing
to identify the distributing person, is offensive to the freedom of
speech of the Fourteenth Amendment. 62 The majority, drawing on
the reasoning from Lovell v. City of Griffin GA63, held that requiring
self-identification on pamphlets would be overly burdensome so as
to dilute the right to free speech. 64 The Court further noted that
59. See David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudo-
nymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 154-55 (1996)
(identifying numerous court references to anonymity of Federalist Papers in justi-
fying right to publish anonymously).
60. See Ekstrand, supra note 57, at 407 (providing common justification for
societal tolerance of anonymous speech to democratic processes). "It has long
been argued that anonymous speech is essential to the democratic process because
it is often the only way for unpopular views to be heard." Id.; see also Lee Tien,
Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REv. 117, 123-
24 (1996) (characterizing court treatment of anonymity as speakers' rightful
choice).
61. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-66 (1962) (affirming right to anon-
ymous speech as protected by First Amendment and noting certain required dis-
closures overly burden free speech).
62. See id. at 60-61 (presenting facts in case involving "whether the provisions
of a Los Angeles City ordinance restricting distribution of handbills 'abridge the
freedom of speech and of press secured against state invasion by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution'" is valid). The ordinance in question provides
that "[n]o person shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under circumstances,
which does not have printed on the cover... the name and address of the follow-
ing: (a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same. (b)
The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however, that in the
case of a fictitious person or club, in addition to such fictitious name, the true
names and addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the person sponsoring
said hand-bill shall also appear thereon." Id. at 61.
63. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (holding that requirement of license for distribution
of pamphlets and leaflets in public was unjustifiably burdensome upon free
speech).
64. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 62-64 (referring to Court case in which ordinance
that forbade any distribution of literature at any time or place in Griffin without
license was held void and reasoning that requiring licenses would allow de facto
censorship in pamphleteering, "historic weapons in the defense of liberty."). See
id. at 64-65 (reviewing historical perspective for free speech in United States as
developed from colonial era, during which British censorship laws sentenced per-
sons to whipping, fining, and death for writing, printing or publishing seditious
material).
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the Talley ordinance failed to limit the prohibition to accepted ar-
eas of control, such as obscenity.65
2. Modern Protections for an Ancient Right
The effect of the Internet on the increased potential for
libelous tort places pressure on the traditional doctrine of the right
to publish anonymously.66 As a result, courts have taken divergent
approaches to the issue of whether a plaintiff can uncover the iden-
tity of an anonymous defendant. The Justices of the Supreme
Court have provided minimal guidance and as a result state and
federal courts have crafted competing doctrines to address this is-
sue. The Supreme Court, in Reno v. ACL U57, characterized the In-
ternet as a free speech zone.68 In Reno, the Supreme Court, in
analyzing the constitutionality of the CDA, held that the Internet is
not held to the same standard of the media; a standard that holds
anonymous publishing to be a long-recognized and unquestioned
right.69 Accordingly, modern court decisions have struggled with
upholding the right to publish anonymously on the Internet.7
0
However, the rise of citizen journalism and the Internet's increas-
ing pervasiveness in everyday life has changed since Reno was de-
cided in 1996, such that the decision to hold the Internet to a non-
media standard may no longer be fitting.71 Additionally, the right
to publish anonymously on the Internet places a court in a difficult
position with respect to discovery and service of process, which
largely presumes the ease in identifying John Doe defendants.
72
65. See id. at 63-64 (commenting on failure of drafters to limit ordinance to
content that is "obscene or offensive to public orals or that advocates unlawful
conduct," but is general ban of all handbills that fail to meet identification
requirements).
66. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (indicating recognition by Court of Internet's ability to expand capacity to
torts, including defamation, copyright infringement and trademark infringement).
67. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
68. See id. at 847-48 (holding that Internet is not to be held to same degree of
free speech protection as media companies).
69. See id. (explaining rationale for decision based on limited access to In-
ternet's questionable material by accident by under-aged persons).
70. SeeJohn Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (recognizing First Amendment protection of anonymity in publishing
extends to Internet).
71. See Macrander, supra note 27, at 1098-1100 (detailing changes leading to
comparison of bloggers and journalists in citizen journalism); see generally
Technorati, supra note 7 (studying growing prevalence of news-themed and politi-
cal-themed blogs in recent decades).
72. See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578 (observing that court recognizes diffi-
culties posed by anonymous Internet defendants to traditional court functions, in-
cluding limited restraining order issuance, service of process and discovery).
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The Internet and the increased ability for anonymity have changed
that presumption. 73
In Columbia Insurance Company v. Seescandy.com, a District Court
in California addressed the question of whether a plaintiff may pro-
ceed to trial despite failure to provide adequate service to an anony-
mous defendant.7 4 Columbia Insurance Company, owner of the
Sees Candy trademark, attempted to bring suit for trademark in-
fringement against an unknown entity which had registered the
website URLs "seescandy.com" and "seescandys.com. '' 75 Despite
numerous attempts to trace the prospective defendant through In-
ternet detective work and subpoena, Columbia was unable to ade-
quately gather enough information to serve process upon the
defendant. 76 The Court reasoned that allowing Internet anonymity
would stifle plaintiffs' ability to seek adequate remedy and, further,
would heighten a defendant's ability to commit Internet tort, in-
cluding "defamation, copyright infringement, and trademark in-
fringement, entirely on-line . . . ,,77 As a result, the Court
established a multi-step process for plaintiffs to identify the defen-
dant, establish a suit that could withstand a motion to dismiss and
demonstrate that discovery would likely lead to the identity of these
73. See id. at 576-77 (ascertaining that certain remedies, including injunction,
and discovery processes against anonymous Internet defendant would be largely
ineffective or disallowed by currentjurisprudential rules of civil procedure). "Tra-
ditionally, the default requirement in federal court is that the plaintiff must be
able to identify the defendant sufficiently that a summons can be served on the
defendant .... This requires that the plaintiff be able to ascertain the defendant's
name and address." Id. at 577.
74. See id. at 575-76 (scrutinizing plaintiff, Columbia Insurance Company, for
attempt to seek injunctive and damage relief against unknown person who regis-
tered trademarked domain names, traceable only through IP address, which re-
quires additional cooperation from Internet Service Provider for discovery of
defendant's identity).
75. See id. at 576 (classifying dom.-in names as "alphanumeric strings that are
associated with particular IP addresses," allowing easier access to particular website
and often associated, in corporate branding with trademark or brand, but which
can be done without any particular claim to intellectual property).
76. See id. at 576 (illustrating numerous unsuccessful plaintiff attempts to lo-
cate defendant through falsified, incomplete and periodically changing addresses
and contact information).
77. Id. at 578.
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defendants. 78 If these steps were met, then the court would allow
an extension as opposed to dismissal of the case. 79
The right of anonymous publishing is not absolute, however,
and under certain circumstances, a court will pierce this protection
and require a defendant to disclose his or her identity.80 However,
American courts have been unable to agree what standard should
be applied or what test is applicable to determine when anonymity
should be overcome. 8 1
The Virginia Circuit Court's decision, In re Subpoena Duces Te-
cum to America Online (hereinafter "In re AOL"), applied a good faith
standard in cases where the interest of a plaintiff in overcoming
anonymity must be balanced against the first amendment rights of
the anonymous defendant in anonymity.8 2 Specifically, the Court
noted that anonymous protection does not protect against bona
fide defamatory statements and recognized the jurisprudential chal-
lenge presented by cyberspace, message boards and other Internet
media.83 However, the court further noted that the burden is on
78. See id. at 578-80 (identifying three limiting principals for determination of
whether discovery of anonymous defendant should be granted: (1) "the plaintiff
should identify the missing party with sufficient specificity that the Court can de-
termine that the defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal
court;" (2) "the party should identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive
defendant;" and (3) "plaintiff should establish to the Court's satisfaction that
plaintiff's suit against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss").
79. See id. at 580-81 (presenting grant by court to plaintiff of fourteen days
from date of order to file appropriate forms for limited discovery for identity of
plaintiff).
80. See In Re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., No. 40570,
2000 WL 1210372, at *6-7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan., 31, 2000) (clarifying that right to speak
anonymously is not absolute and subjecting right to good faith standard).
81. See id. at 5-6 (noting other courts, federal legislation, and recent Supreme
Court cases have provided little guidance regarding determination of whether sub-
poena is oppressive).
82. See id. at 6 (describing question posed before court as whether extension
of First Amendment right to anonymity to chat room and message board Internet
communications should be granted). Regarding issuance of unreasonable or op-
pressive subpoenas, a court should order the ISP to provide information regarding
identity when (1) "the court is satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied to
that court," (2) "the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate good faith
basis to contend that it may be the victim of conduct actionable," and (3) "the
subpoenaed identity information is centrally needed to advance that claim."). See
id.
83. See id. at 7 ( "Any defamatory statements made by one or more of theJohn
Doe defendants would not be entitled to any First Amendment protection."). The
court notes that using Internet message boards to release confidential insider in-
formation can cause damage that falls outside the scope of defamation, in addition
to the existing tortuous claims that arise from libelous activity on message boards.
See id.
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the plaintiff to prove a legitimate case; it refused to adopt a specific
test for this determination.8 4
The federal courts mirrored the approach taken by the In re
AOL court in Rocker Management LLC v. John Does 1 through 20 (here-
inafter "Rocker Management') .85 In this case a New Jersey Federal
District Court addressed whether statements made on Yahoo! Inc.
message boards and chat rooms by an anonymous poster named
"harry3866" would provide grounds for the libeled Plaintiff, a New
Jersey investment management firm, to overcome the anonymity.8 6
The court, using the Seescandy test to move past a motion to quash,
applied a totality of the circumstances test to determine the third
prong of the test, whether the plaintiff has a genuine case that
could survive a motion to dismiss.8 7 Due to the lack of evidence
available in the pre-discovery phase, the court held that the totality
of the circumstances test allowed the court to consider the broad
context in which the statements were made, the subject of the state-
ments, their specific context, the likelihood of hyperbole and the
context of the reader in interpretation.88
Nevertheless, in Doe v. Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court re-
jected the good faith standard of the New Jersey court in favor of a
summary judgment standard.89 In Cahill, the court enumerated the
standard in Delaware for overcoming anonymity.9 0 As such, the
court held that the Plaintiff demonstrated that the case withstood a
summary judgment standard.91 This summary judgment standard,
84. See id. at 7-8 (rejecting proposed test by plaintiff, AOL, as unnecessarily
precedential for subpoena reasonability requiring first, prima facie claim of being
victim of tortuous conduct, and second, subpoenaed information as important to
claim).
85. Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John Does 1-20, No. 03-MC-33, 2003 WL 22149380
(N.D. Cal. May 31, 2003).
86. See id. at 1 (describing statements posted as business libel, "threatening
analysts who are bullish on certain stocks' and of spreading lies 'about those
stocks'," in addition to insinuating Securities and Exchange Commission investiga-
tion against plaintiff.)
87. See id. at 1-2 (establishing application of totality of circumstances test in
situations to determine whether particular statement is libelous).
88. See id. at 3 (concluding that complaint's dismissal was result of failure of
statement to be libelous in light of totality of circumstances, despite certain key
facts, including identity of poster or given particular target audience, remaining
unknown at time of decision).
89. 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005) (rejecting good faith standard established
by courts in other jurisdictions in favor of more stringent summary judgment
standard).
90. See id. (specifying "less stringent" good faith standard "less capable" of
screening out frivolous lawsuits).
91. See id. (explaining that summary judgment standard is necessary to bal-
ance plaintiffs right to protect reputation against defendant's right to exercise
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which is higher than the good faith standard, requires that a plain-
tiffs case be able to overcome dismissal by the Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b) (6) standard, which is a dismissal by "failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted."92
In Cahill, a local councilman brought suit against a John Doe,
who posted statements over a two day period on a local state news
Internet website alleging that Cahill suffered from "character
flaws," had an "obvious mental deterioration," and that he "is as
paranoid as everyone in the town thinks he is."93 Cahill obtained
John Doe's Internet Service Provider ("ISP") and Internet Protocol
("IP") address by court order, which would have allowed John
Doe's identity to be subpoenaed.9 4 Once informed, John Doe im-
mediately filed a protective order with the court to prevent disclo-
sure of his identity.9 5 In applying the good faith standard for
determining the disclosure of an anonymous defendant, the trial
court held that the Cahill's could obtainJohn Doe's identity.96 The
superior court held that the application of the good faith standard
was inadequate and applied a summary judgment standard, reason-
free speech, specifically adopting modified test from earlier New Jersey appellate
court decision).
92. See id. at 460-61 (holding that overcoming summary judgment motion is
required to force disclosure of anonymous defendant). The modified Dendrite test,
adopted as the standard by the New Jersey court in Cahill, requires that a plaintiff:
(1) "undertake efforts to notify the anonymous poster that he is the subject of a
subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, and to withhold action to af-
ford the anonymous defendant a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposi-
tion to the application," (2) "to set forth the exact statements purportedly made by
the anonymous poster that the plaintiff alleges constitute defamatory speech," and
(3) "satisfy the prima facie or 'summary judgment standard.'" See id. at 460 (citing
Dendrite Intl., Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001)); see also FED R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6) (providing modern codification of demurer
"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . ").
93. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454-55 (identifying statements posted on Internet
blog sponsored by Delaware State News under alias "Proud Citizen," making dis-
paraging comments about Councilman Cahill in negative comparisons to Mayo
Schaeffer and alleging severe character defects).
94. See id. at 455 (classifying ISP generally, to be business organization provid-
ing service and connection to websites and persons wishing to design websites). IP
addresses are specific number codes unique to Internet-able computers designed
to allow identification of terminals. Id. Although IP addresses are unable to pro-
vide identity, most ISPs maintain identification records linked with IP addresses.
Id.
95. See id. (rejecting trial judge's denial of Doe's motion for protective order
and holding that good faith standard for requiring disclosure of anonymous plain-
tiffs identity was met).
96. See id. at 454-55 (explaining good faith standard requires: "(1) that they
had a legitimate, good faith basis upon which to bring the underlying claim; (2)
that the identifying information sought was directly and materially related to their
claim; and (3) that the information could not be obtained from any other
source").
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ing that the balance between the protecting free speech and that
the act of preventing defamation lawsuits may chill free speech.97
The summary judgment standard articulated by the Cahill court re-
quires that a plaintiff: (1) undertake efforts to notify the anony-
mous poster that he or she is the subject of a subpoena or
application for order of disclosure, and (2) satisfies a prima facie or
summary judgment ruling by the court.98
In addition to modifying the standard to overcome anonymity,
the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that in the case of public
figure defendants, providing prima facie proof without discovery,
with respect to the actual malice standard, would be near impossi-
ble and held that it is not required to plead actual malice for defa-
mation in overcoming a defendant's anonymity. 99 Having modified
the test to reject Cahill's good faith standard in favor of a modified
summary judgment standard, the Delaware Supreme Court re-
versed the judgment of the Superior Court of Delaware, finding
that the statements made against Cahill did not constitute prima fa-
cie defamation. 100
One problem with applying First Amendment protections to
anonymous publishing includes the difficulties in distinguishing be-
tween types of free speech; thus, often nuanced and cumbersome
rights are applied, such as the difference between broadcasted and
printed media. 10 1 The legal standard applied to each type of speech
is often difficult to determine because of the varied levels of protec-
tion afforded to different types.10 2
97. See id. at 461 (articulating reasons for applying higher standard and re-
jecting both good faith standard and original four part summary judgment test
from lower court).
98. See id. at 460-61 (providing requirements for summary judgment standard
that differ from earlier Dendrite standard).
99. See id. at 464 (discussing difficulty for plaintiff as public figure to over-
come summary judgment standard). "Without discovery of the defendant's iden-
tity, satisfying this element may be difficult, if not impossible. Consequently we do
not hold that the public figure defamation plaintiff is required to produce evi-
dence on this element of the claim." Id.
100. See id. at 467-68 (holding that statement made about Cahill would be
unclear to third-party observer as fact, thus, cannot qualify as defamatory).
101. See Lidsky, supra note 54, at 1552-54 (distinguishing between media type
source of defamation in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)).
102. See id. at 1555-58 (investigating relation between different types of
speech and considering different levels of protection given to speech as result).
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C. Defamation and the Internet
The right to free speech and free press, while not absolute, has
been fairly well protected by courts when balanced against other
compelling government interests, including protection from claims
of defamation. 10 3 Defamation has traditionally been a very limited
doctrine within the United States. 10 4 The Internet, in both ex-
panding the reach and amplifying the resilience of a defamatory
statement in effectiveness and viability, has challenged this
limitation.1 0 5
Like many common law doctrines, defamation in the United
States is inherited from British common law and is subject to bal-
ancing against the First Amendment right to free speech and
press.10 6 Recognizing the importance of free speech and press to a
democratic political system, the Supreme Court has enumerated a
number of principles designed to curtail the reach of defama-
tion. 10 7 One specific limiting principle articulated by the Supreme
Court involves public figures. As articulated in N.Y. Times v. Sulli-
van, defamation against a public figure must involve "actual
malice."10 8
1. The N.Y. Times Standard Expanded: What is a Public Figure?
In N.Y. Times, the Supreme Court held that in order for defa-
mation to apply to a "public figure," an additional requirement of
"actual malice" is required in addition to the common law test 0 9
103. See id. at 1577-79 (mentioning balancing required by First Amendment
in traditional tort claims).
104. See Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking 'John Doe" Defendants: The Case Against
Excessive Hand-Wringing Over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REv. 795, 797 (2004) (iden-
tifying limitations of defamation doctrine when applied to United States Constitu-
tional law system).
105. See Orin S. Kerr, Blogs and the Legal Academy, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 1127
(2006) (emphasizing tendency towards indestructibility of information online and
potential reach to wide audiences). See generally Tien, supra note 60, at 173-82 (dis-
cussing various Supreme Court cases' evolving standard for privacy, anonymity and
subsequent application to Internet).
106. See Lidsky, supra note 54, at 1581-89 (examining historical role of anony-
mous free speech and balancing that against historical development in context of
First Amendment assumptions).
107. See id. at 1548-52 (evaluating Supreme Court's decision in McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), as attempt to recognize limits in appli-
cability of free speech doctrine in certain areas, such as election law).
108. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (communicating that "constitutional guaran-
tees require" showing of "actual malice").
109. See id. at 279-80 (defining "actual malice" with regard to defamation as
"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not").
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The Supreme Court defined actual malice as with knowledge of
falsehood or "with reckless disregard" as to falsehood. 110 The Su-
preme Court, in later cases, expanded the definition of "public fig-
ure" beyond its original meaning in N.Y. Times."'
Courts continue to refine the application of the N. Y. Times
standard for defining public figures.' 12 Currently, "public figure"
refers to anyone who willfully or intentionally places themselves
into the public light, including sports casters, actors, and potentially
blogs themselves." 3 The justification commonly provided for hold-
ing public figures to a different standard in defamation is that pub-
lic figures' conscious exposure to public scrutiny, a characteristic
unshared by non-public figures, creates an obligation for tolerance
of a certain amount of negative commentary."14
2. Actual Malice in the Virtual World
As a doctrine, the "actual malice" standard has been much
maligned by legal commentators and practitioners."15 The doc-
110. See id. at 267-68 (conveying other requirements of "libel per se" under
Alabama law include words "tend[ing] to injure a person... in his reputation" or to
"bring (him) into public contempt," which extends to public officials if it injures
public office, imputes misconduct, official integrity or breach of fiduciary trust).
111. See id. at 268 (referencing previous case discussion of public men as be-
longing to public in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), and citing found-
ing father precedent for having public officials be tolerant of certain scrutiny, even
rising to level of defamation); see also Curtis Publ'g v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155
(1967) (extending definition of public persons to non-officials who may sue under
same standard). "We consider and would hold that a 'public figure' who is not a
public official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose sub-
stance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent ...." Id.
112. See Victoria Cioppettini, Modern Difficulties in Resolving Old Problems: Does
the Actual Malice Standard Apply to Celebrity Gossip Blogs?, 19 SETON HALLJ. SPORTS &
ENr. L. 221, 227-30 (2009) (setting forth evolution of N.Y. Times standard and
providing applications of more recent examples within entertainment industry, in-
cluding Carol Burnett and Clint Eastwood).
113. SeeN.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (defining actual malice); see also Antony
Ciolli, Bloggers as Public Figures, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255, 269-71 (2007) (examin-
ing effect of Internet in developing public figures generally and continuing with
similar test for "public figure" determination).
114. See Cioppettini, supra note 112, at 227-28 (reviewing rationale behind
Supreme Court's decision to establish "actual malice" requirement); see also Ciolli,
supra note 113, at 267-68 (quoting Eric Walker, Defamation Law: Public Figures -
Who are They?, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 955, 970 (1993)) (identifying test applied by
lower courts regarding determination of "public figure" as whether plaintiff "vol-
untarily [rose] to the forefront of the public controversy" ).
115. See Aaron Perzanowski, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for
Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REv. 833, 833 (2006) ("The public figure doc-
trine has become ananachronism."). See generally Nicole A Stafford, Lose the Distinc-
tion: Internet Bloggers and First Amendment Protection of Libel Defendants - Citizen
Journalism and the Supreme Court's Murky Jurisprudence Blur the Line Between Media and
Non-media Speakers, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 597, 603 (2007) ("One court arguably
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trine requiring distinction between media and non-media speakers,
developed in the wake of N. Y. Times v. Sullivan, has created confu-
sion among lower courts, especially with the rise of citizen journal-
ism blogging.11 6
Attempted application of this standard to the virtual world of
the Internet has challenged some basic assumptions which gave rise
to the "actual malice" standard, leading some commentators to sug-
gest that a new test is necessary. 117 Many negative critiques of the
"actual malice" standard include the uncertainty of application."18
While the original formulation by the Supreme Court held only me-
dia corporations to the actual malice standard, and by extension
not to everyone else, the rise of blogs, some of which can be viewed
as a hybrid between media companies and non-media companies in
function, if not design, led to queries regarding the applicability of
the "actual malice" standard to blogs."19
D. A Hypothetical Fact Pattern
Imagine the following situation: You are a local elected politi-
cian in your town, the very definition of a "public figure" according
overcompensated to meet First Amendment guarantees, and at least one court
disregarded constitutional considerations in setting a standard for whether to un-
mask the anonymous defendant at the summary judgment stage.").
116. See Stafford, supra note 115, at 604-05 (recognizing tendency among
lower courts to create new and different standards for evaluating Internet defama-
tion cases and taking note of differing trends in NewJersey, Pennsylvania and Del-
aware State courts). "Thus, state courts are setting forth widely varying
constitutional protection when addressing motions to unveil the identity of anony-
mous defendant-speakers in Internet libel claims, suggesting both that Supreme
Court guidance is required and that collapsing the media/non-media distinction is
necessary to prevent a chilling effect on such speech." Id.
117. See id. at 612 (advocating removal of media/non-media distinction from
Internet defamation consideration). See generally Perzanowski, supra note 115, at
844-56 (promoting media access as rationale for whether test requires application
of "actual malice" standard, utilizing media access and consequent change
presented by Internet as challenge to assumptions made by Supreme Court regard-
ing media).
118. See Stafford, supra note 115, at 606 (characterizing application of non-
media categorization of "actual malice" standard to protect bloggers as misapplica-
tion of First Amendment doctrine).
119. See id. at 611 (asserting Supreme Court's unintentional creation of me-
dia/non-media distinction in N.Y. Times, and subsequent cases, including Reno v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), make no distinction between In-
ternet and other forms of publication). See Perzanowski, supra note 115, at 848-51
(finding that assumptions which led Supreme Court to develop "actual malice"
standard do not apply to blogs or Internet, and that in recent Supreme Court cases
Internet is significantly different from media to warrant application of standard).
"Many-to-many communication is steadily displacing one-to-many communication
central to the public figure doctrine. No technology embodies this trend better
than the Internet." Id. at 851.
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to the N.Y Times standard. 120 You have recently implemented legis-
lation that is extremely unpopular with a segment of your constitu-
ency, many of whom are active members of various private
organizations and are technologically savvy and Internet-capable. 121
You are sitting in your office one day and you receive an e-mail
from one of your younger staff interns. Upon clicking on the e-
mailed link, you open a website that has an extremely scathing mes-
sage about your recent actions. 122 The editorial contains references
to your meetings with questionable people, so-called "public com-
ments made" and other events that did not occur, all seeming to
imply that you are incompetent.123 Further, additional comments
made in a section below the editorial are similarly defamatory, and
seem to indicate that many people in the public have read this edi-
torial and taken time to respond. 124 Shortly afterwards, you receive
concerned and alarmed e-mails from many members of the local
community, demanding accountability for your actions and threats
to pull support from you as a result of this editorial. 25 You would
like to sue for defamation, to either force an injunction to pull the
website or receive damages against the John Doe, but you have very
little information about the John Doe beyond the posting. 12 6 What
do you have to prove before a Court to subpoena the identity of the
anonymous writer and can you, a "public figure," successfully sue
for defamation?
III. ANALYSIS
This section focuses on the problems that "public figure" plain-
tiffs face when trying to bring a successful defamation lawsuit
against an anonymous blogger, particularly the difficulty in over-
120. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454-55 (mentioning similar legal scena-
rio for Councilman Cahill as provided in this fact pattern); see also N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (establishing standard for public figures pre-
supposed in this scenario).
121. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454 (portraying similar scenario).
122. See id. (observing similarity of message posted, alleging character defect
and incompetence).
123. See id. (comparing differences between hypothetical and Cahill, defama-
tion is clearly false in this hypothetical, although author's anonymity continues to
belie questions of whether falsehood was libeled knowledgably or with reckless
disregard).
124. See id. at 454 (involving similar reputational damage to Councilman
Cahill).
125. See Cioppettini, supra note 112, at 226-27 (conveying that requirement of
defamation is "harm caused by the publication. Such statements may cause injury
to one's personal reputation, but either injury suffices for defamation recovery.").
126. See id. (reviewing basic requirements for tortuous defamation and addi-
tional requirement posed by "actual malice" for "public figure" plaintiffs).
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coming: (1) anonymity to determine "actual malice;" and (2) First
Amendment protection to free speech. 27 In other words, the pro-
tections of the First Amendment and requirements for public fig-
ure defamation, when left unmodified, combine to form an
absolute shield, effectively immunizing anonymous blogger defend-
ants in defamation lawsuits by "public figure" plaintiffs. 12
Additionally, even if a "public figure" plaintiff was to success-
fully overcome John Doe's First Amendment anonymity through
subpoena, the evidentiary requirements to prove "actual malice"
are significant. 129 Further, unlike large media company operations,
formal editing processes, company employees and paper trails are
not available as similar evidence against blogs. 13 0 This section will
explore the possible solutions explored by courts and scholars re-
garding this problem. 131
A. Overcoming Anonymity
A defamation lawsuit by a "public figure" plaintiff is unlikely to
overcome an anonymous defendant's anonymity in discovery be-
cause a determination regarding "actual malice" is usually made
through evidence that is not available until after discovery, thereby
tying a Gordian knot.13 2
127. See generally Lidsky, supra note 26, at 888-904 (isolating problems that
arise when attempting to apply First Amendment anonymity protections to public
persons).
128. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457-58, 464 (addressing interaction of two doc-
trines to necessitate creation of loophole for "public figure" plaintiffs).
129. See Stafford, supra note 115, at 606-07 (expressing challenges to bring
suit against blogger whom there is no fact-check and for whom proof of "actual
malice" is not easily available). See Malloy, supra note 12, at 1191-92 (explaining
that although "actual malice" is not required to be proven in subpoena of anony-
mous defendant's identity, it is still presumable standard that "public figure" plain-
tiffs must meet before court to successfully sue for defamation).
130. See Protecting the New Media, supra note 31, at 1005-07 (noting most blog-
gers lack fact checking mechanisms and oversight that larger traditional media
companies have). But see Macrander, supra note 31, at 1098 (arguing that source-
checking difference between journalists and bloggers is largely illusory, as both
remain fallible in terms of actually functioning as prevention of false publishing,
citing CBS Dan Rather example); see also Troiano, supra note 6, at 1472-75 (sug-
gesting that bloggers and journalists carry out same function in presenting news
and that bloggers review of their own sites and incentive to publish trustworthy
information serve editorial and publisher oversight functions).
131. For a full discussion of solutions explored by courts in addressing
problems of defining media, see infta notes 189-216 and accompanying text.
132. For a full discussion of the problematic interaction between defamation
and First Amendment anonymity in this specific situation, see supra notes 133-163
and accompanying text. See Merriam-Webster Dictionary: 'Gordian Knot,' MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Gordian&20
knot (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (defining Gordian knot as "an intricate prob-
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1. Traditional First Amendment Rights and Writer's Anonymity
The right to publish anonymously in the United States is pre-
sumed.1 3 3 Therefore, to overcome anonymity through compulsory
discovery, a plaintiff is required to present a case and, depending
on the court, may be held to a variety of standards.1 3 4 Two compet-
ing court-developed standards to overcome anonymity developed:
(1) good faith, and (2) summary judgment.13 5
The good faith standard, applied in In re AOL, allows anonym-
ity to overcome a legitimate good faith basis if: (1) the information
sought is directly and materially related to the claim, and (2) the
information is unable to be obtained from another source. 136 In
the hypothetical, the plaintiff would likely be able to track down the
IP address and ISP of the individual posting on the message
board.13 7 If a plaintiff approached the court to request a subpoena
for the IP owner's identity, such a request would be granted if the
plaintiff could demonstrate a good faith legitimate basis for defa-
mation and the exhaustion of other methods of investigation. 138
Although the removal of the actual malice requirement would only
be for purposes of discovering identity, demonstrating a case for
defamation under the good faith standard is easier than the alter-
native summary judgment or actual malice standards. 139
lem[,]" derived from Alexander the Great's solution to a knot incapable of being
untied by cutting through it with a sword.)
133. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 455-56 (portraying right to publish anonymously in
United States presumed under First and Fourteenth Amendments).
134. See id. at 458-60 (noting different standards of good faith and summaryjudgment under which scenario has been decided in lower and state courts).
135. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000
WL 1210372, at *7-8 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000) (identifying good faith standard
for lawsuit, citing varying standards required for prima facie case establishment).
But see Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463-64 (identifying modified summary judgment
standard).
136. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 455 (providing commonly applied good faith stan-
dard under which claim brought).
137. See id. at 460-62 (providing likely reaction when seeking ISP and IP ad-
dress from Councilman Cahill example).
138. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372,
at *7 (identifying good faith test and requirement to demonstrate "a legitimate
basis to believe that it may have bonafide claims against the John Does before com-
pliance with the subpoena duces tecum is ordered .... What is sufficient to plead a
primafacie case varies from state to state .... This Court is unwilling to establish
any precedent that would support an argument that judges of one state could be
required to determine the sufficiency of pleading from another state when ruling
on matters such as the [granting of the subpoena for discovery of identity
motion.]").
139. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 (recognizing summaryjudgment standard pro-
vides harsher standards for plaintiffs than good faith standard).
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Under the summary judgment standard, the hypothetical
plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the defamation suit would
survive a motion for summary judgment, an exceedingly difficult
standard for public plaintiffs who must also prove actual malice. 140
Even if the removal of the actual malice requirement was pre-
sumed, demonstrating a case for defamation that would survive
summary judgment in the absence of the defendant's identity
would be exceedingly difficult.1 4 1
Using the summary judgment standard may prove too strong a
shield for a defendant against a legitimate plaintiff.142 Thus, using
the summary judgment standard articulated in Rocker in conjunc-
tion with defamation law suit requirements, a John Doe blogger
could make horrific allegations about a public figure which would
fall short of the per se defamation, and, as a result, be protected.1 43
Further, under an actual malice subjective standard where there is
lack of knowledge of the defendant, a defamation suit could fail
summary judgment, and halt the further discovery required to de-
velop a case. 144
2. Traditional Defamation Applied
In defamation cases, a plaintiff typically must establish that "(1)
the defendant made a defamatory statement; (2) concerning the
plaintiff; (3) the statement was published; and (4) a third party
would understand the character of the communication as defama-
tory."145 Further, public figure plaintiffs must establish that the
140. See id. at 464-65 (listing requirements under Delaware law to pass sum-
mary judgment standard and noting difficulty for proving actual malice, element
beyond plaintiffs control or ability to investigate from anonymous defendant).
141. See Malloy, supra note 12, at 1188-89 (noting difficulty of standard in
light of court's decision to remove actual malice from elements required, as result
of court's misperception of blogs and type of damage sustained by defamation).
142. See id. at 1190-93 (claiming that perception of court regarding situation
in terms of damage from Internet defamation, nature of blogs and mischaracteriz-
ing extra-judicial measures as accurate remedy effectively disenfranchising plaintiff
from claiming required damages).
143. See Rocker Mgmt. v. John Does 1 Through 20, No. 03-MC-33, 2003 WL
22149380, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2003) (providing example of message board
posting which injured reputation of investment company through falsifying re-
ports of securities investigation and analyst misconduct that California District
Court found not to rise to level of defamation).
144. See Malloy, supra note 12, at 1190 (noting court's deference to anony-
mous bloggers, taking point with court's failure to see repercussions of decision,
which has potential to damage, for example, employment reputation in case of
background checks, vigilantism in case of alleged crimes, and government investi-
gation in case of alleged illegal or terrorist connections).
145. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 (outlining elements of defamation according
to Delaware law).
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statement is false, and that the defendant made the statement with
actual malice.1 46 The ability to prove defamation goes to both the
summary judgment and the good faith standard in securing a sub-
poena compelling discovery of the defendant's identity. 14 7
In reference to the hypothetical, setting aside the requirement
of proving that the plaintiff is a public figure, and thus covered by
the N. Y Times standard, the requirement for actual malice for defa-
mation suits against public figures poses significant difficulty for the
hypothetical plaintiff.148 One difficulty includes the requirement
that the alleged defamatory statement was made with either: (1)
knowledge of its falsity, or (2) reckless disregard for its truth. 149
If a defendant's identity is unknown, numerous scholars have
noted that it is extremely difficult to prove a defendant's statement
was made with either knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard
for its truth. 150 In many cases regarding allegedly defamatory state-
ments, the plaintiff is forced to proceed to court without discovery
or knowledge of: (1) the libeler's identity, (2) the full context in
which the statement is made, and (3) circumstantial evidence re-
garding the anonymous defendant's state of mind at the time.15 1
146. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (establishing ac-
tual malice standard for public figure plaintiffs to recover on theory of defama-
tion); see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 (outlining additional requirements, in
addition to discussion of necessary damages, for successful defamation suits in
Delaware).
147. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 (discussing damages required under theory of
defamation in order to claim relief in Delaware).
148. See id. at 463-64 (addressing problems hypothetical plaintiff will face).
149. See id. (highlighting requirements faced by hypothetical plaintiff for def-
amation without actual malice). "Given that the plaintiff will have easy access to
proof of five of the six elements of a defamation claim, it is not overly burdensome
to require the plaintiff to submit a verified complaint or affidavits to substantiate
that claim." Id.
150. See generally Cioppettini, supra note 112, at 241-46 (identifying four
problems associated with bringing lawsuit against anonymous blogger). "[T]he
veil of an anonymity on the Internet; the Communications Decency Act's (CDA)
heightened protection standards; a blogger's lack of legal responsibility for post-
ings of third parties on his websites; and the inability to 'unmask' a blogger." Id. at
241-42. Of the four listed problems, the inability to "unmask a blogger" directly
pertains to this discussion. See id. at 246-47 (noting lack of accountability with
respect to anonymity or responsibility to postings creates barrier to successful
lawsuit).
151. See Malloy, supra note 12, at 1189-90 (noting example in Cahill, which
resulted in decision without knowledge of libeler); see also Lidsky, supra note 54, at
1555-56 (discussing significance of proceeding to court from anonymous position,
positing experience of Recording Industry Association of America and attempt to
track and initiate lawsuits against online copyright infringers).
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3. Tying the Gordian Knot: John Doe's Refuge
The protection given to defendants by the First Amendment
and the N.Y. Times standard provides a significant barrier for a
plaintiff to overcome. 152 Although courts acknowledge that the
First Amendment does not protect defamation and that anonymity
can be overcome by satisfying either the good faith or summary
judgment standards, the effect of both doctrines applied together
insulates a defendant against a plaintiffs attempts at discovery. 153
The actual malice standard, as applied subjectively to the total-
ity of the circumstances based on the position of the defendant,
may be difficult to achieve without knowing the defendant's iden-
tity. 154 Although courts, including the Delaware Supreme Court in
Cahill, hold that public figure defamation plaintiffs do not need to
produce evidence of actual malice to satisfy the summary judgment
standard for discovery purposes, the insubstantial information
plaintiffs hold may not be sufficient, without the identity of the
poster or intended target audience, to rise to the level of defama-
tion. 155 Hypothetically, if the court in Cahill knew John Doe was a
political rival for Councilman, a position establishing a strong show-
152. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458-60 (discussing requirements and procedures
for meeting elements of defamation to primafacie level required by court against
anonymous libeler); see also Macrander, supra note 27, at 1085-87 (identifying types
of barriers that dual protection provides and current trends for application of
those barriers before various courts of law).
153. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000
WL 1210372, at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000) (stating "[any defamatory state-
ments made by one or more of the John Doe defendants would not be entitled to
any First Amendment protection"); see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458-60 (providing
history of different tests used by courts to determine when anonymity can be over-
come). See generally Tien, supra note 60, at 147-54 (summarizing potential harm
caused by allowing anonymity to harass various minority groups, inability to redress
harm adequately, social deterrence cost, and intangible cost to Internet viability as
medium).
154. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 466-68 (recognizing inability of plaintiff to supply
anything other than allegedly defamatory statement, leading court to only analyze
statement and subsequent replies in absence of context).
155. See id. at 464 (recognizing extreme difficulty proving actual malice
before court from plaintiff prior to discovery of defendant's identity and holding
that lesser standard is required for public figure plaintiffs). The court held that:
"[A] public figure plaintiff must plead the first five elements and offer
prima facie proof on each of the five elements to create a genuine issue
of material fact requiring trial. In other words, a public figure defamation
plaintiff must only plead and prove facts with regard to elements of the
claim that are within his control."
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ing of knowledge of falsity and intent, the court may have been
willing to entertain the summary judgment standard. 156
When comparing the actual malice standard for defamation to
the good faith standard for overcoming anonymity, the material re-
quirements of good faith turn on the definition of a legitimate
good faith basis as viewed by a judge. 157 The first requirement, that
the plaintiff have a legitimate, good faith basis upon which to bring
the underlying claim, if taken to mean a standard less than that of
establishing a prima facie case, still must identify the standard re-
quired to prove good faith. 158 Setting this standard too low will al-
low plaintiffs to seek defendant's identities without significant cost,
potentially enabling plaintiffs to target comparatively poorer defen-
dant bloggers, thus realizing a chilling effect on free speech. 159
If a court applied the actual malice standard to a plaintiff seek-
ing to subpoena the identity of an anonymous blogger, it would
result in a near total impasse, yielding full protection for an anony-
mous defendant to commit libel; however, it is unlikely that a court
would select that option as opposed to the good faith or summary
judgment standards. 160 A potential public figure plaintiff, when de-
ciding whether or not to pursue a lawsuit, must decide whether a
prima facie defamation case has been developed to warrant pierc-
156. See generally Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 54, at 1559-63 (identifying infor-
mational value of authorial identity to speech context; therefore, speech provided
is valued regarding credibility and personal trademark). Further, it is stated that:
Anonymous speech persists despite fact that it is, on average, less valuable
than non anonymous speech to speech consumers (audiences) who often
use speaker identity as an indication of a work's likely truthfulness, artistic
value, or intellectual merit. Without attribution, audiences must necessa-
rily rely on other indicia, which can be less reliable than speaker identity.
Id. at 1559.
157. See Ekstrand, supra note 60, at 423-25 (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. Sees-
candy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999)) (demonstrating varied nature of
good faith standard as applied in Seescandy.com). Thus, at the very least one is
required to attempt to contact an anonymous defendant to effect service of pro-
cess; however, this is applied to different standards. See id. (noting differing stan-
dards in Doe v. 2TheMart, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1095-96 (W.D. Wash. 2001), In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372, at *6-7
(Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), and Am. Online v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co.,
542 S.E.2d 377, 385 (Va. 2001)).
158. See id. at 425-26 (outlining second and third requirements under good
faith standard: that information could not be obtained from another source, and
that indentifying information sought was directly and materially related to claim).
159. See Lidsky, supra note 26, at 888-91 (anticipating chilling effect in cyber-
space caused by setting low standard for allowing plaintiffs to pierce anonymity).
160. For a further discussion of results to applying pure standards of First
Amendment anonymity and actual malice standard, see supra notes 46-102.
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ing anonymity. 161 In addition to this balancing, the plaintiff must
also engage in a cost-benefit analysis to weigh whether the cost of a
lawsuit and the possibility of winning damages from an anonymous
defendant, with potentially shallow pockets, is worth the cost of a
lawsuit. 162 In the end, the uncertainty of standards, litigation costs,
and limited potential remedies effectively shields anonymous
defendants. 163
B. Proving Defamation
Even assuming a public figure plaintiff was able to overcome
the burdens of First Amendment protection for anonymity, thereby
piercing anonymity protections and allowing discovery of a defen-
dant's identity, a successful defamation lawsuit would require a
plaintiff to establish that a defendant acted with actual malice, the
standard set by the Supreme Court in N.Y. Times. 164 The standard
evolved for protecting the freedom of the press, and provides two
immediate problems: (1) do blogs receive the same standard that
the press and other traditional news media receives; and (2) if so,
how does the public figure defamatory standard provide a means of
bringing successful lawsuits against blogs, which admittedly do not
function in the same way that traditional news media companies
do?165 The problem can be reduced to two issues: (1) the applica-
ble legal standard, and (2) evidentiary issues.
161. See Lidsky, supra note 26, at 890-91 (noting potential factors going into
deciding whether to initiate lawsuit as plaintiff against anonymous defendant).
162. See id. at 890-92 (discussing that high cost of libel litigation, for both
plaintiff and defendant, weighs against defendant due to realistic cost limitations
of parties). Thus, it is stated that:
This new class of nonmedia defendants are unlikely to have enough
money even to defend against a libel action, much less satisfy ajudgment.
Thus, wealthy plaintiffs can successfully use threat of a libel action to pun-
ish the defendant for her speech, regardless of the ultimate outcome of
the libel action.
Id. at 891.
163. See Perzanowski, supra note 115, at 851-54 (noting that many-to-many
communications multiply number of parties involved in potential lawsuit, differing
from one-to-many communication paradigm of previous media companies).
164. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 464 (Del. 2005) (noting that although
actual malice is not required for piercing anonymity, requirement is not removed
from proving public figure defamation); see also Garry, supra note 31, at 597-99
(reviewing standards posed by libel law with respect to First Amendment).
165. See Macrander, supra note 27, at 1095-97 (examining treatment of blogs
by courts with respect to standard held to and treatment received). "[F]inding a
place for new media inside existing law is all the more necessary because of new
media's rising influence in general society." Id.
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1. Problems of Legal Standard: Bloggers as News Media
The Constitution distinguishes freedom of the press and free-
dom of speech within the First Amendment, implying that a differ-
ent standard is applied to each. 166 If blogs are considered press,
then the freedoms given may include an arguably heightened pro-
tection against suits for defamation. 167 Conversely, if blogs are con-
sidered speech, then the freedoms given may include a lesser level
of speech protection. 168 Additionally, the dissimilarity and variety
amongst blogs may enable only certain blogs to qualify as media. 169
In this situation, courts would be required to determine appropri-
ate standards and tests to determine the protections given to a spe-
cific blog.1 70
Courts have generally avoided questions that determine the le-
gal status of blogs, usually attempting to side-step the issue by using
another analysis.' 71 InJarvik v. CIA, the court resolved the question
of whether the plaintiff, a self-identified journalist operating a per-
sonal blog, may appeal from a denial of a fee waiver request under
the Freedom of Information Act by addressing the issue of the re-
quirement for fee waiver as opposed to the question ofjournalism's
standards for bloggers.172
166. See Richards, supra note 46, at 1857-60 (discussing whether to accept de-
notative or connotative contextual reading of Constitution, tending to result in
different interpretations for specific phrases).
167. See generally Troiano, supra note 6, at 1451-60 (exploring idea that blogs
pose threat to existing media due to speed of publication, ability to network, and
encouragement of legislation granting immunity under certain circumstances).
168. See id. at 1471-73 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe, 2005 WL 578641
(Cal. Sup. Mar. 11, 2005)) (discussing whether bloggers are journalists in both
function and in legal definition).
169. See Protecting the New Media, supra note 31, at 1005-07 (recognizing al-
though bloggers and journalists function similarly in bringing newsworthy items to
wider audiences, bloggers lack certain aspects that have been considered vital for
media function, including sense of professional responsibility, regulation, and for-
mal editorial processes).
170. See id. at 996-98 (assessing likelihood of finding journalistic protection
for bloggers, determining that from practice perspective, it will be determined in
court by statutory construction). "Although a blogger has little chance of prevail-
ing under a shield law protecting only 'newspapers,' most shield laws include defi-
nitional language that leaves open the luestion whether bloggers are covered." Id.
at 1002.
171. See Macrander, supra note 27, at 1096 (noting avoidance of issue by vari-
ous courts). "The question of whether blogs and bloggers can, or should be, con-
sidered journalistic remains unresolved, and mostly un-debated in the law." Id.
172. See id. (citing Jarvik v. CIA, 494 F. Supp. 2d 67, 67-69 (D. D.C. 2007))
(recognizing court evaded question by finding that plaintiff did not meet pleading
requirements for fee waiver).
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2. Problems of Proof. Do Blogs Fact Check?
Aside from questions regarding the appropriate legal standard,
the differences between operating blogs and operating traditional
news media companies makes the application of actual malice diffi-
cult.1 73 In previous cases, traditional news media companies have a
variety of protective operational checks, including fact checking,
editorial review, editorial control and business planning. 1 74 Blogs,
unlike traditional news media sources, tend to be smaller opera-
tions lacking the same resources to devote to such controls.' 75 This
leads to a two-fold problem: (1) from an evidentiary point, it is diffi-
cult to find evidence through discovery to support or deny a claim
of actual malice; and (2) it is questionable whether it is fair to hold
bloggers to the standards developed to control larger media
companies.'
76
With respect to the evidentiary question, blogs tend to be
smaller operations, funded minimally, and whose "publishing"
schedule is not conducive to structured fact-checking and other es-
tablished media mechanisms. 177 Proving actual malice is largely a
state-of-mind issue; requiring that at the time the statement was
made, the author had knowledge of its falsity or acted with reckless
173. See Troiano, supra note 6, at 1471-74 (discussing increasing similarity that
blogs and traditional news companies share with respect to their function, includ-
ing recent cases in which plaintiff argued for bloggers to have rights traditionally
belonging to journalists); see also Ciolli, supra note 113, at 255-57 (describing "blog-
ging revolution" as inherently affecting journalism, politics, business, and
academia). Blogs may be defined by: (1) chronological function, (2) diary func-
tion, and (3) amateur journalist function. See id. at 259-60 (discussing possible
definitions for blogs). Of the three definitions, amateur journalist is the most lim-
ited and comes closest to the justification, as alternatives to mainstream news
sources, to having similar protection. See id. (expressing methods of classifying
blogs and protection).
174. See Protecting the New Media, supra note 31, at 1005-08 (noting rationale
behind journalistic protection, including shield laws, generates similar rationale
for application to bloggers if bloggers serve similar functions in society).
175. See id. (discussing bloggers acting as pseudo-self-regulating organizations
to mitigate threats to accuracy from lack of formal editing process, ease of entry
into blogosphere, low transparency, and partisanship).
176. See Macrander, supra note 27, at 1096-97 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Doe, 2005 WL 578641 (Cal. Sup. Mar. 11, 2005)) (identifying California Superior
Court's refusal to divide "shield laws" to cover distinction between "legitimate" and
"illegitimate" news, holding that this function should be left to market place and
not to court).
177. See id. (noting differences in operation of blogs and traditional media);
see also Ciolli, supra note 113, at 277 (identifying treatment of blogs as limited pur-
pose public figures would raise cost of blogging, causing potential chilling effect
for traditionally low cost activity with mass participation).
2010]
31
Tham: Honest to Blog: Balancing the Interests of Public Figures and Ano
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
260 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
disregard to its truth. 178 Without the elaborate system of fact-check-
ing and editorial oversight, it is difficult to prove that a blogger
would have known of a falsehood. 79 With respect to the reckless
disregard to falsity, however, it could be argued that the lack of fact-
checking mechanisms for blogs is analogous to reckless disregard of
truthfulness. 8 0 However, this raises the question of whether blogs
should be held to the same standard as large media companies.18 '
With respect to the question of fairness, holding blogs and
bloggers to a standard developed for the purpose of holding larger
media companies accountable for their actions has yet to be fully
justified, despite significant discussion among scholars.' 82 Requir-
ing blogs to meet the standard of media companies with signifi-
cantly more resources and a highly vested interest in maintaining
professional standards as reporters, is unfair if the standard for
reckless disregard for truthfulness requires costly checking sys-
tems.a8 3 Additionally, holding the entire blogosphere, which is di-
verse and includes media-focused and non-media focused blogs, to
a single standard may not yield fair results.'8 4
178. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-81 (1964) (defining actual
malice standard for public figure defamation).
179. See Stafford, supra note 115, at 612-14 (noting bizarre result of providing
greater protection to media professionals than everyday bloggers as result of me-
dia/non-media distinction if blogs are held to non-media standard, noting that
lower courts would turn to "factors that should not be considered in granting or
denying First Amendment protection, such as the size of the publication, its nature
and scope, its audience and circulation.").
180. See Troiano, supra note 6, at 1472-75 (discussing that although blogs lack
formal mechanisms for fact-checking, presence of this function suggests that this
standard for actual malice should be included).
181. See Stafford, supra note 115, at 599-600 (tracing development of early
blogging into citizen journalism and noting certain prominent academic higher
institutions of journalism beginning to offer courses in blogging). "Today, blogs
are both grassroots and corporate operations.... A number of mainstream media
institutions have gotten into the business of maintaining blogs . . . includ[ing]
ABC, FOX News, MSNBC and The Wall Street Journal." Id.
182. See Cioppettini, supra note 112, at 247-48 (noting many blogging pieces
can be more traditionally classified as "op/ed" pieces of traditional media than
news sources of traditional media, and therefore, protected to some degree as
opinion).
183. See Perzanowski, supra note 115, at 847-48 (discussing public figure doc-
trine, among others, as product of old media companies, and noting that requir-
ing bloggers to conform to this standard may yield unfair results. "As a result of
their use of one-to-many communication, the media shared a number of common
traits. First, they were relatively few in number .... Second, traditional media
defendants exerted considerable influence over the content of public debate." Id.
at 849.
184. See id. at 851-54 (distinguishing Internet media many-to-many model
from old media one-to-many model in assumptions used by courts to propagate
standards for defamation); see also Solove, supa note 13, at 1195-98 (noting differ-
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C. Untying the Gordian Knot: Resolving
Anonymity and Defamation
Given the complexity of conflicting standards in free speech
and defamation, it is not surprising that various courts have avoided
resolution of the issue in the absence of guiding precedent from
the United States Supreme Court.185 Several courts have suggested
resolutions that effectively avoid the legal need to solve this Gor-
dian knot.1 86 Another alternative is to implement or employ non-
defamation theories to pursue the tortfeasor, such as negligent in-
jury to reputation or economic loss. 187 A third alternative is to
weaken either the rules regarding anonymity, defamation or both,
when confronted with this specific situation of a public figure plain-
tiff bringing suit against an anonymous defendant blogger. 188
1. Hiding the Gordian Knot: Non-Legal Resolution to Defamation
As previously mentioned, several judges have suggested alter-
native, non-legal remedies. 189 Some legal commentators proposed
dealing with third parties through independent investigations to at-
tain the name of John Doe defendants without resorting to sub-
poena prior to discovery.1 90 Other legal commentators have
recommended countering or retaliating against defamatory state-
ent kinds of blogs existing within same genre of blog, which may require different
standards if media journalistic function-approach is used).
185. For a further discussion of methods courts have used to avoid resolving
the issue, see supra notes 66-102 and accompanying text.
186. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 465-66 (Del. 2005) (noting extra-judici-
ary options for remedy to this kind of injury, including replying online to allegedly
defamatory statement).
187. See generally Travis M. Wheeler, Negligent Injury to Reputation: Defamation
Priority and the Economic Loss Rule, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 1103, 1103-06 (2006) (suggesting
non-defamation theory of negligent injury to reputation as means for recovery
when defamation theory is unhelpful or inapplicable).
188. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 54, at 1594-98 (citing Cahill, 884 A.2d at
454-67) (recommending that modification of standard as balance between anony-
mous speech right in torts cases is required, similar to calculation in Cahill, but not
necessarily to same result).
189. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (stating that extra-judicial relief is available to
wronged plaintiff; and providing that Internet allows plaintiff to respond to anony-
mous defendant in kind online). "[The plaintiff can respond to his libeler on the
Internet, and] can thereby easily correct any misstatements or falsehoods, respond
to character attacks, and generally set the record straight." Id.
190. See Columbia Ins. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(suggesting implicitly in discussion of factors, to consider under good faith test,
that attempts to discover and contact client are necessary for any standard, and
stressing that this action is requirement of any kind of due diligence prior to legal
recourse).
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ments by replying on the same message boards and websites to cor-
rect the fact and limit or minimize damage. 191
Although these suggestions are helpful, they tend to under-
state or mischaracterize the damage caused by online defama-
tion. 192 In many cases, these remedies are unhelpful to recoup the
losses to reputation sustained. 193 Furthermore, engaging in discus-
sions with defamatory tortfeasors may spur additional defamation
or lend credibility to postings by responding in kind.194
2. Avoiding the Gordian Knot: Negligent Injury to Reputation and the
Economic Loss Rule as a Non-Defamation Solution
A second alternative to resolve the issue of contrary standards
for defamation' and free speech' is to pursue additional forms of
legal recourse other than through defamation theory.' 95 In gen-
eral, the two kinds of damage often experienced by public figure
plaintiffs are reputational and economic. 196 In the case of reputa-
tional damage, a public figure plaintiff may attempt to pursue dam-
ages and restitution through a negligent injury to reputation
theory, should there also be tangible economic loss. 19 7
In situations of reputational damage, applying a negligence
theory rather than one of defamation shifts the burden/focus,
therefore requiring the traditional negligence analysis. 198 Of the
191. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (noting that ability to respond in kind on
Internet as instant form of mitigation for reputational damage made on Internet
blog or chat room).
192. See Malloy, supra note 12, at 1191-92 (citing Cahill, 884 A.2d. at 460-66)
(suggesting that Court's misunderstanding of type of damage caused by online
defamation and by blogs as whole cannot be fixed adequately by redressing con-
cerns on similar forum).
193. See id. at 1191 (noting Court characterization of harm suffered as under-
stated, as victims of online anonymous bloggers suffer harm that has long term
repercussions, involving job loss and humiliation, and in extreme circumstances,
making plaintiff target by certain interested groups).
194. See Perzanowski, supra note 115, at 863-64 (reviewing how significance of
plaintiff or defendant self-help requires analysis of access to relevant audience in
repairing or correcting any damage to their reputation, which may prove to be
very difficult).
195. See Wheeler, supra note 187, at 1103-04 (providing overview concept of
negligent injury to reputation as alternative to defamation, focusing on scenarios
where economic damage is not suffered along with reputation damage).
196. See id. at 1104-05 (noting introductory cases which explain concept of
injury to reputation and economic loss, highlighting lack of general agreement on
negligent injury to reputation tort would be allowed in any given jurisdiction).
197. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454-55 (noting scenario where loss would be purely
reputational, when politician suffering from libel-like activity falls short of
libelous).
198. See Wheeler, supra note 187, at 1113-14 (citing Ross v. Gallant, Farrow &
Co., 551 P.2d 79, (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976)) (explaining doctrine of negligent injury to
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elements of negligence required, a potential plaintiff may have dif-
ficulty demonstrating damages, especially in the event of pure
reputational harm. 199 Even if a court were to accept this theory, in
cases of pure reputational damage, quantification of harm (and
therefore determining an adequate remedy) may be difficult.200
While alternative theories would allow the plaintiff to recover
against a defendant, they require a prima facie showing similar to
that of a negligence case to overcome anonymity protections of In-
ternet defendants. 20 1 Because traditional proof of negligence re-
quires a showing of breach of duty, requisite factual and legal
causation, and damages, potential plaintiffs may have difficulty
demonstrating these elements before a court.20 2 Unlike the actual
malice requirements of public plaintiff defamation, these elements
do not require a requisite mental showing. 20 3
3. Cutting the Gordian Knot: Removing the Actual Malice Requirement
A third alternative to solving the problem of convergent stan-
dards between defamation and free speech theory is to weaken one
or both with respect to this particular problem. 20 4 In the long
term, this is the most practical solution, as it requires a rebalancing
of the two competing interests in a way that sets an appropriate
standard and, more importantly, a procedure for resolution. 20 5
reputation as mechanism that allows circumvention of defamation doctrine, but
requires traditional application of negligence rules, including duty).
199. See id. at 1118-22 (discussing application of economic loss rule, which
serves as limiting component to recovering damages in tort that generally provides
ill-defined damages, is based in either faux contract or in limited duty analysis).
200. See id. at 1123-34 (noting difficulty in applying economic loss rule as limi-
tation due to difficulty of quantifiable damages, and historically unclear and di-
verse application by courts).
201. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463-64 (discussing requirements of summaryjudg-
ment standard as requiring prima facie showing of underlying tort); see also
Wheeler, supra note 187, at 1104-05 (explaining, in this case, requirement of prima
facie showing of breach of duty, requisite causation, and damages).
202. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463-64 (discussing requirements of summary judg-
ment standard as requiring prima facie showing of underlying tort and difficulty
at doing this)
203. Compare Wheeler, supra note 187, at 1104-05 (noting requirements of
negligent injury to reputation), with Cahil4 884 A.2d at 463-64 (identifying require-
ments of defamation of public figures, including actual malice requirement of
knowingly false or reckless disregard for truth).
204. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 54, at 1598-1602 (proposing ideal stan-
dard, comprising of "1. Notice to the Anonymous Speaker," "2. Applying a Quali-
fied Privilege to Speak Anonymously," "3. Overcoming the Privilege," and "4.
Balancing Harms.").
205. See id. at 1590-1592 (suggesting that in case of low value speech, includ-
ing commercially motivated speech, it would be possible to implement state of
Mandatory disclosure). The mandatory state approach, while applicable in certain
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This solution was implemented in Cahill, in which the Delaware Su-
preme Court removed the actual malice requirement for defama-
tion with respect to public figure plaintiffs.20 6
Removing the actual malice requirement for public figure
plaintiffs is a seemingly elegant solution that compliments the the-
ory that blogs and the Internet should be held to a different stan-
dard than traditional media companies. 20 7 If the blogosphere is
held to a non-media standard, then proof of defamation where a
blog is a defendant may not require the level of defamation to
reach levels of actual malice. 208 If actual malice is no longer the
standard, then a potential plaintiff must only present prima facie
elements of defamation, which are primarily under the plaintiff's
control, to the court to remove anonymity.209
This seemingly elegant solution, however, has implications for
the First Amendment right of anonymity which serve to weaken it
when applied to the Internet blogosphere.210 By holding the blogo-
sphere to a different standard than traditional media companies,
this approach advocates a return to media-based rather than con-
tent-based defamation for analyzing defamation against the same
class of plaintiff. Theoretically, this would allow for the same state-
ment published anonymously in a newspaper to have protection
from identity discovery, whereas the same statement published on
an online blog would allow discovery of the anonymous author.211
instances of defamatory speech motivated by commercial interest, is not likely to
cover certain speech against political public figures, which could be covered under
a core political free speech theory, or that of speech that has economic ramifica-
tions, but are not purely commercial. See id. at 1589-92 (discussing special privilege
for political, literary, artistic or other core speech).
206. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (removing actual malice standard for purposes
of overcoming anonymity in pre-discovery phase).
207. See Malloy, supra note 12, at 1192-93 (highlighting contradiction in rea-
soning by recent Courts that Internet was found to be no different than any other
medium, but that it is functionally extremely different).
208. See Stafford, supra 115 at 612-15 (noting that Supreme Court initially did
not consider media/non-media standard, and that application of actual malice
standard to blogs would not necessarily deplete free press clause of independent
significance or provide differing standards of defamation to similar statements by
media source).
209. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (recognizing that if defamation of public
figures no longer requires actual malice, then standard is removed from both
piercing anonymity and from proving case of defamation at trial).
210. See Stafford, supra note 115, at 603-05 (proposing elimination of media/
non-media distinction due to confusion amongst lower courts in application).
211. See id. at 605-12 (noting that even if consistent standard were applied
across American jurisdictions, this standard of applying differing level of protec-
tion to non-media compared to media forms is inconsistent with Supreme Court
conception of testing defamation).
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In other words, a double standard posed by a media-focused ap-
proach would result.2 12
Additionally, some scholars posit that, although the most so-
phisticated and simple approach to resolving the tangled knot, the
new standard that evolves is incorrect.213 The assertion is that re-
moving the actual malice element would provide too much protec-
tion to anonymous online bloggers against public figure plaintiffs
seeking discovery of their identity, and could result in the chilling
of free speech on the Internet.214
Conversely, some scholars contend that, despite this new stan-
dard, anonymous bloggers still would have too much protection in
committing defamation. 215 The Internet's ability to convey cheap
and widespread messages necessitate that defamed persons should
equally have access to inexpensive and efficient means of seeking
recourse against libelers. 216
IV. CONCLUSION
As the blogosphere continues to expand and perform a signifi-
cant role within people's lives as part of an ever increasing and
evolving set of accessible mediums, the potential for Internet-based
defamatory tort increases. 217 In conjunction with the First Amend-
ment free speech right to publish anonymously, situations in which
courts must handle public figure plaintiffs and anonymous defend-
212. See id. at 613-15 (discussing impracticability of current standard in con-
flict with First Amendment).
213. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 54, at 1598-1602 (proposing new stan-
dard for overcoming anonymity which requires notification, identifying qualified
privilege as presumption to be overcome, and balancing harms in deciding dam-
ages); see also Perzanowski, supra note 117, at 861-65 (proposing relative access test
as replacement for actual malice standard based on plaintiff's ability to access cor-
rective counter speech to determine application of actual malice); see also Lidsky,
supra note 26, at 888-91 (noting ease of threatening libel suit, which are difficult to
win but easy to file, and that majority of defendants will be non-media defendants
with limited means to defend).
214. See Stafford, supra note 115, at 604-05 (noting chilling effect of speech if
standard for either defamation or anonymity protection is set too low, and that
guidance should be established by Supreme Court).
215. See Malloy, supra note 12, at 1187-88 (discussing shifting purpose and
focus of blogs over time necessitates redressed standard for blogosphere, in light
of new commercial and corporate character in blogs).
216. See generally Tien, supra note 60, at 146-51 (recognizing that injuries per-
petrated on Internet in personal harm, redressing harm, and social deterrence can
be decreased by utilizing anonymity as defense, but also recognizing relative ease
with which defamatory harm is committed online).
217. See id. at 117-21 (noting how vital anonymity is to Internet, but recogniz-
ing role that negative anonymous Internet actions play, including defamation or
offensive speech and harassment).
2010]
37
Tham: Honest to Blog: Balancing the Interests of Public Figures and Ano
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
266 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
ants are likely to increase. 218 In the short term, courts may avoid
resolving issues of competing standards by deciding cases on other
issues. 219 In the long term, the frequency of this issue and the
trans-border nature of Internet blogs will require consistent treat-
ment at the federal and state level.2 20
The Internet's growth provides opportunities to commit de-
famatory tort, and magnifies the damage potential of an individ-
ual.22 1 Unlike non-Internet defamation, which requires active
solicitation of an audience, the Internet has lowered the transaction
cost to information proliferation. 222 In an increasingly information
sensitive world, the potential to create both reputation and tangible
damage with defamatory comments on message boards, websites,
and blogs from the safety of a pseudonym is tremendous. 223
As previously illustrated, even without the Gordian knot that
displays the clashing standards between defamation and the First
Amendment, applying traditional defamation analysis to blogs still
has its challenges. 224 Because the law has yet to adapt older stan-
dards to apply in the relatively new and different system of the In-
ternet blogosphere, lower courts are often left without guidance in
searching for an appropriate balance between the defendants' in-
terests in the First Amendment right to anonymity and the plain-
tiffs' interests in recovering for defamation. 225 If lawsuits by public
218. See Technorati, supra note 7 (tracking trends in growth of blogging as
sustainable growth from both human resources and financial perspective); see also
Ciolli, supra note 113, at 261 (noting growth in blogs in both formal and informal
sense, as it pertains to self-titled blogging communities and websites in general).
219. For a further discussion of methods adopted by court to sidestep issue,
see supra notes 66-102.
220. See Lidsky & Cottery, supra note 54, at 1598-1602 (discussing proposals to
establish single standard for defamation and anonymous speech).
221. See Tien, supra note 60, at 151-53 (observing that Internet speech lowers
barriers to entry as opposed to increased spread, noting that it allows for "cheap
speech" without any form of quality control).
222. See id. at 152 ("Online speakers are amateurs, unrestrained by the need
to placate advertisers or readers, or by any sense ofjournalistic or editorial discre-
tion or ethics. Thus, Internet messaging is viewed as potentially more irresponsible
223. See id. at 180-82 (recognizing reputational interest among online com-
munity has far more reaching implications than mere Internet identity, and that
anonymity can protect against abuses and harassment which are relatively easy to
commit).
224. For a further discussion of the methods adopted by court to sidestep the
issue, see supra notes 66-102.
225. See Malloy, supra note 12, at 1187-89 (discussing disagreement between
legal commentators regarding proper standard for protection in defamation and
anonymity, and noting inability to properly balance interests in absence of clearer
understanding of blogs and new media).
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figure plaintiffs against anonymous defendants have any hope to
achieve consistent standards and application, a binding decision
must be reached to decide the proper approach from the various
standards and tests. 226
Yang-Ming Tham*
226. See Stafford, supra note 115, at 604-05 (suggesting need for binding pre-
cedent and coherent standards in area of defamation and First Amendment
protections).
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